To be honest, I have almost nothing critical to say about Jim's presentation (and this is quite unusual for a cranky analytic philosopher like me!). What Jim has said is all very sensible, and his examples are very well chosen, etc. So, instead of making critical remarks, I will try to expand a little on one of the themes Jim briefly touched upon in his talk: the contextuality of probability.
Jim mentioned that personalistic Bayesian probabilists run squarely into the problem of contextuality every time they apply Bayes' Theorem. When a Bayesian asks "What should my degree of belief in H be (i.e., what probability should I assign to H ), given my total evidence E ?", they will have to be able to say what the probability of H should have been prior to having learned E . These "prior probabilities" are only scrutable in the context of the entire structure of the agent's prior beliefs (Bayesian belief structures are assumed to have a fair amount of a priori structure, e.g., Boolean algebra). This contextuality of subjective probabilities is well known, and has been a source of great controversy and pain for practicing Bayesians.
What I would like to emphasize in my brief remarks is that many kinds of probability face equally deep problems of contextuality: this is not just a problem for Bayesians (i.e., subjectivists about probability). I will illustrate this point with two examples. First, an example involving an infamous contemporary legal case. After the O.J. trial, Alan Dershowitz remarked on T.V. (this was quoted widely in the papers -see [2] ) that "fewer than 1 in 1,000 women who are abused by their mates go on to be killed by them". Here, Dershowitz is not talking about a subjective probability -he is talking about an objective probability (a frequentist or statistical probability, I presume). And, given the context, we may assume that he intended this remark to be relevant to the estimation of the probability of a particular abuser's guilt of murder (O.J.).
To fix our ideas, and to make things more precise, let A be the proposition that Nicole Brown Simpson is abused by her spouse (O.J.), let K be the proposition that Nicole Brown Simpson is killed by her spouse (or ex-spouse, O.J.), and let Prp¨|¨q be whatever objective (say, statistical) conditional probability function Dershowitz has in mind here (more on this below). Now, Dershowitz is claiming (roughly) that:
Shortly after Dershowitz made this remark, the great statistician I.J. Good wrote a brief response in Nature [5] . Good pointed out that, while Dershowitz's claim may be true, it is not salient to the case at hand, since it ignores crucial additional contextual information that is available to us. Good claims that what's really important here is not the probability that Nicole Brown Simpson was killed by O.J., given that she was abused by O.J., but the probability that she was killed by O.J., given that she was abused by O.J. and that she was killed. After all, we do know that Nicole was killed, and (plausibly) this information should be taken into account. Let K 1 be the proposition that Nicole Brown Simpson was killed (by someone). Using Dershowitz's (1) as a starting point, Good does some back-of-theenvelope calculations (largely on the basis of speculation about the other relevant frequencies), and comes up with the following "guesstimate":
This would make it far more probable that O.J. is the killer than Dershowitz's claim would have us believe. Independently, but using actual data about murders committed in 1992, Merz & Caulkins [6] estimate that:
This would seem to provide us with an even greater probability of O.J.'s guilt. Dershowitz [2] 
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We could continue this dialectic ad nauseam. I'll let you add whatever further epicycles you like to the opposing sides of this dispute. Probabilists (and philosophers of probability) are all to familiar with this morass! This is often called "the reference class problem". 1 That's just a fancy name for the contextuality of objective probabilities (in this case, frequencies or statistical probabilities).
Here's a more striking example illustrating the contextuality of statistical probabilities. Question: "What's the probability that John Doe has cancer?" Answer: there are many ways to answer this question, depending on which reference class John Doe is included in. It turns out that John is 65 years old. If we just look at the frequency of cancer among 65 year-old males, then (presumably) we'll get a relatively large (at least, non-trivial) number. But, John is also an avid runner and a vegetarian. Presumably, this bumps the number down. However, he's a longtime smoker, which (say) bumps the number back up again, etc. This sequence can be continued in various ways. So, which reference class is "the right one"? Which context will give us "the true probability that John Doe has cancer" (analogy with special relativity: which frame of reference gives "the true velocities"?)? Perhaps we should include all of the properties that John has, in order to determine "the true probability". This will not do, since it will uniquely pick-out John Doe, which will force the probability in question (understood as a "frequency" of cancer in the singleton "reference class" tJohn Doeu) to be either one or zero (depending on whether or not John Doe in fact has cancer).
I will not try to offer a solution to this problem here (my Nobel Prize awaits me when I do!). I aim here only to expand upon what Jim has said about the contextuality of subjective probability. The main lesson is that moving away from subjective probability to a more objective variety (like frequencies or statistical probabilities) does not eliminate the contextuality problem -it seems that probability claims of any kind are only meaningful and precise in relation to specific probability models. I think it is important to emphasize this more general point, since some people might have the impression that the contextuality of (personalistic) Bayesian probability stems only from its subjectivity. This would be a false impression.
